The recent publication of first English/Welsh Commercial Victimisation Survey (CVS) 
Introduction
Internationally, there is a paucity of contemporary data on crimes against businesses.
Although some surveys have been conducted in a number of European countries and as far afield as China, Australia, Mexico and Nigeria (for a review, see Mugellini, 2013; Australian Government, 2004) data are not regularly collected and often focus on the retail sector (see BRC, 2015) rather than the wider business community. It would also be true to say that, although a body of academic research has explored commercial victimisation, the subject remains on the periphery of mainstream victimology (Maguire, 2012) . While governments have a responsibility to be seen to be acting proactively to protect businesses, and trade bodies work to protect the economic interests of their members (Burrows and Hopkins, 2005) , it can be argued that academics have been reluctant to research commercial victimisation as businesses are viewed as being 'undeserving' or not having true victim status. For example, Karman, (2012: 2) asserts that victimology focuses on the 'scientific study of physical, emotional and financial harm people suffer because of illegal activities'. As businesses are not 'people', one could possibly argue that the commercial sector should not be of interest to victimologists. Indeed, central to the study of victimology is Christie's (1986) concept of the 'ideal victim', who is defined as 'a person or category of individual who when hit by crime most readily is given the complete and legitimate status of being a victim' (Christie, 1986:18) . Van Wijk (2013:160) notes that it is a sort of 'public status' of 'hero or traitor' and although it is not clear who deserves victim status, we 'generally have an understanding of what is meant'. Indeed, many scholars have used the analogy of the 'little old lady' as the ideal victim (as she is weak and easy to sympathise with) and Christie (1986) asserts that the ideal victim should be (1) weak; (2) carrying out a respectable project; (3) is not to be blamed; (4) is victimised by a big/ bad offender; (5) the offender is unknown; but the victim (6) is powerful enough to make his or her case known without threatening strong countervailing vested interests.
As academic criminology has often cast businesses as powerful corporations that tend to be offenders rather than victims (see Whyte, 2007; DeKeseredy, 2011) , arguing that businesses could ever be considered as 'ideal' victims is difficult. Indeed, the widely held view that businesses are economically vibrant and able to take care of their own security needs (Burrows & Hopkins, 2005) adds to this notion of the undeserving victim. Despite this, some research has identified high rates of victimisation and costs of crime for business when compared to households (see for example Gill, Fisher & Bowie, 2002; Burrows & Hopkins, 2005; BRC, 2015) . However, some scholars have noted that this abstract notion of the 'victimised business' or 'crimes against businesses' has an important social effect (Whyte, 2007) . As Green (2007: 452) suggests in the context of businesses, the notion of victimhood has been reconstructed as interested parties have 'assert [ed] that a crime against business is a crime against all of us'. Therefore, large corporations express the negative effects of crimes against businesses by emphasising wider social impacts -for example, by suggesting that crimes such as shoplifting can result in increased pricing of goods for all (see for example, BBC Wales, 2014) . It has also been noted that by constructing their position as 'victims', powerful corporations have been allowed to take centre stage in debates around law, order and crime prevention. This is despite the growing recognition of the 'devastating social impact of corporate offending' (Whyte, 2007: 453) .
The publication of the first CVS in England/Wales (see Home Office, 2013; Home office, 2014 ) in over ten years shows the government's commitment to crimes against businesses as a policy issue. It also represents a good time to reflect on the notion of 'crimes against businesses' within victimology. Therefore, this paper has two principal aims. First, through re-analysis of commercial victimisation survey data, contemporary patterns of crime across six business sectors and some of the key characteristics of victims are presented. Second, the concept of 'the ideal victim' is explored in relation to business and it is considered whether (a) the label could ever be applied to commercial victims and (b) why achieving victim status might be important. The purpose of the analysis is not to argue that business should have more power in debates around law and order or even leverage more crime prevention resource from government, but to illustrate that a more nuanced understanding of crimes against businesses might not only help to debunk the abstract concept of business crime, but also enable victimologists to identify fruitful areas for future research.
The Commercial Victimisation Survey
The findings are based on the re-analysis of data collected for the 2012 Burrows and Hopkins (2005) for an overview.
introduced agriculture and arts/entertainment (at the expense of manufacturing and transport) 4 . The sectors covered were defined as follows:
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• Wholesale and retail: wholesale and retail of products (including repair of motor vehicles or motorcycles);
• Accommodation and food services: hotels and hostels; restaurants, cafes, public houses and food takeaway businesses.
• Manufacturing: manufacture and repair of products (excluding repair to motor vehicles or motorcycles)
• Transport and storage: passenger services (taxi, bus, rail and air), road, rail and air freight, postal services, warehousing in relation to transport services.
• Arts, entertainment and recreation: arts, library and museum activities; operation of sports and fitness clubs; gambling and betting activities; operating of amusement parks/ arcades.
• Agriculture, forestry and fishing: animal and crop farming, support services for agriculture and fishing.
The number of businesses across each sector responding to the surveys is presented in Table   1 . It should also be noted that both samples included a mixture of small/large businesses and those that had premises on several sites. For example, 49% (n=1,959) of the 2012 sample and 64% (n=2,614) of the 2013 sample businesses employed less than ten staff on site. Over half of all businesses (58%: n=2,314 in 2012 and 67%: n=2,728) operated out of just one location. 4 The sectors in the 2012 survey represent around 24% of all UK business premises and 42% of employees. In 2013, they represented around 21% of business premises and 33% of employees (based on business population estimates in BIS, 2014). 5 These are based on Standard Industrial Classification Codes (see HM Government 2008 In addition to data on experiencing crime, other useful data were collected in relation to the costs of crime, crime prevention devices installed and details of some of the characteristics of the communities in which the businesses are located.
Crimes against businesses: the extent of victimisation
In this section, rates of crime observed in the CVS are presented. In order to capture the nature of victimisation against businesses (and for ease of presentation), the crime types are typologised into three groups:
1. Property crimes: these are incidents where the offender has direct contact with the business but not directly with any staff. The offender aims to remain anonymous and the principal motivation is instrumental -to take property or cash. Crimes included are burglary, theft, fraud and vehicle crimes and criminal damage 6 .
2. Interpersonal crimes: incidents where the victim and offender have direct face-toface contact. These include robbery, assaults, threats and intimidation of staff by people external to the business.
6 Although the principal motivation for criminal damage is not instrumental, it is commonly recorded as a property crime.
3. E crimes: e-crime involves no spatial or physical convergence between the business, victim or the offender. These are crimes conducted online and include crimes such as hacking and phishing. Finally, the data suggest that e-crime is growing as a crime problem in the commercial sector. Between 6% and 14% of businesses were victims, with around 1 in 7 businesses in the arts and manufacturing sector experiencing an e-crime. By comparison, the 2002 CVS reported that only 2% of manufacturers and 1% of retailers were victims of e-crimes 7 (Shury et al., 2002) . Of course, as most businesses now have internet access and as e-commerce becomes more established, the risks are likely to continue to increase. This concern has been raised by the British Retail Consortium, who in their crime costs survey [2014] [2015] state that 'such attacks continue to pose a critical threat to businesses' (BRC, 2015:14) . Sample base : all CVS 2012 : all CVS (n=4,017) & 2013 and all online crime sample base 2012 (n=1,487) and 2013 (n=1,997) . Table 3 presents the incidence rates of crime expressed as the average number of incidents per 100 businesses. Here, it can be seen that the higher prevalence rate of property crimes translate into higher rates of repeat victimisation. Indeed, there was an average of 1,117 7 In 2002, these were defined as 'having a computer system/network hacked or a website altered without permission' (Shury et al. 2005: 5) . Sample base : all CVS 2012 : all CVS (n=4,017) & 2013 and all online crime sample base 2012 (n=1,487) and 2013 (n=1,997) .
Despite suffering high rates of victimisation, it has previously been suggested that businesses are able to withstand the financial burden of crime. This notion is explored below (Table 4) by considering the financial impact of crime against those businesses with a turnover of over £100,000 per annum compared to those with lower turnover. In this paper, turnover (defined as the total revenue a business generates over the course of a year before expenses are considered) is used as proxy measure of prosperity 8
. For those businesses with turnovers of over £100,000 per annum, the costs of property crimes (which include total loss 8 Profit would be a better measure, but these data were not available.
and damage) 9 and the costs of security are compared to those businesses with a turnover of less than £100,000 for 2012 and 2013
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. It is observed that the higher crime rates for the larger turnover businesses translate into greater average financial losses to crime, with these businesses losing around £6,000 to property crime each year. However, the financial burden of crime appears to be most greatly felt by businesses with lower turnover. When expressed as a proportion of turnover, crime loss for these businesses is 4.2% in 2012 and 1.6% in 2013 -significantly larger than that of the higher turnover businesses. Indeed, the final column shows that expenditure on crime prevention/security is also significantly higher for the smaller businesses (as a proportion of turnover) -at 3.7% in 2012 and 1.2% in 2013.
This indicates that larger businesses might face higher crime risks, but they can possibly absorb crime costs and preventative expenditures much better than smaller businesses. The CVS also illustrates that much of the burden of commercial victimisation falls upon frontline staff in the form of interpersonal violence. Around 1 in every 6 crimes experienced in both sweeps of the CVS involved direct people contact -including around 1 in 2 crimes in the accommodation/food sector and 1 in 3 the arts and transport sector 12 . Burrows et al., 1999) , the CVS also illustrates high risks to staff in the arts/entertainment sector, followed by the accommodation/food sector. As might be were involved in incidents. 12 The odds ratio in the retail sector is lowered by the high numbers of theft recorded in that sector. 13 If one considers the breakdown of interpersonal crime as a prevalence rate by business -in 2012, 3% of businesses were victims of robbery and 2% were in 2013. In 2012, 3% were victims of external assault and 4% were in 2013; 10% were victims of external threats in 2012 and 11% were in 2013. et al. (2011) have identified the physical /psychological impacts such as increased stress and anxiety to staff and high profile cases of injuries to staff in retail and service-based businesses are commonly reported in the media (see Lightfoot, 2014; Asian Trader, 2014) . Analysis of the CVS data reveals that robberies were most likely to result in physical injury to staff. In 2012, 19% (n=22) of robberies resulted in an injury to a staff member (as compared to 12%
(n=10) in 2013). In comparison, in 2012, 15% (n=76) of all other violence resulted in an injury to staff, and it was 11% (n=58) in 2013.
The CVS data do, however, suggest that the risk of physical injury as a result of robbery is lower in the commercial sector than in non-commercial environments. According to CSEW data, around 14 In comparison, the BRC (2015) reported 33 incidents of abuse and violence per 1,000 (or 333 per 10,000) retail workers in 2014. 15 Of course, there can also be financial costs to staff and businesses -such as when staff members need to take time off as a result of injury or when the business has to close for a period of time.
46% of street robberies result in physical injury to the victim, which is over twice the rate recorded in the CVS (ONS, 2014) 16 . Despite this, there is further evidence that frontline workers also face other situations that might generate anxiety. For example, in 26% (n=30) of robberies in 2012 (as compared to 16%: n=14 in 2013), the assailant threatened staff with a weapon (either a gun, knife or other).
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Business vulnerability to crime: characteristics linked to victimisation
Further analysis was conducted to identify characteristics of the businesses most likely to be victims of property and interpersonal crime. Eight independent variables (or predictors) were identified in the CVS datasets that one might expect to be associated with vulnerability to crime (these are presented in table 6). These were run in three logistic regression models to test (a)
whether they were statistically significant and (b) the odds of these factors being associated with property crime, external assaults/threats and robbery
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. The models were run by merging data from both sweeps of the CVS into a dataset of 8,058 businesses. 16 One of the reasons for this is that staff may be more likely to comply with the demands of the offender during a robbery then a victim of a street robbery. Previous research suggests that resisting robbery can increase injury risk (Jones, Casteel & Peek-Asa, 2015) . Indeed, in an informal interview with a Head of Loss Prevention of a major convenience store chain, it was revealed that in the interest of staff safety, when a robbery occurs it is company policy for staff to comply with the demands of assailants. 17 One of the limitations of the CVS was that no data about the emotional impacts of crime or the victim's ethnicity or gender were collected. 18 Property crime, external assaults/threats and robbery were run as separate dependent variables as they are a product different contexts and offender motivations. Property crime is mainly instrumentally motivated, assaults/threats are expressive and robbery is primarily instrumental, but it can be expressive if a violent interaction between the victim and offender develops (Thijssen & De Ruiter, 2011) . 
CCTV on site
If there is CCTV on the premises (internal or external)
Burglar alarm
If there is a burglar alarm installed Table 7 presents the output from three models. Looking at property crime, the biggest predictors are being a retail business 20 and employing ten or more staff members. Both of these predictors double the risk of property crime. However, businesses with a turnover of over £100K and those that are part of a chain of businesses are 1.5 times more likely to be victims than those without these characteristics. This confirms previous research which has illustrated higher risks of property crime for businesses with larger numbers of employees (Burrows et al., 1999) 21 Some research suggests that the presence of a burglar alarm might actually increase the risk of burglary for households (Tilley et al., 2015) -little is known about the impact of burglar alarms in the business context. 22 When considering the relationship between security and victimisation slight caution has to be expressed here.
One of the limitations with the CVS data is that there is a lack of clarity about when security was implemented. In total, 1.6% (n=64) of all premises with a burglar alarm and 1% (n=41) with a CCTV system said they had installed these as a result of crime victimisation in the CVS recall period. However, it is not clear from the survey data what type of crime incident the respondent experienced that led to the installation of security or if the respondent then went on to experience another incident after the implementation of security.
A number of the variables were significantly related to assaults/threats. Businesses in the accommodation/ food, arts/recreation and retail sectors were over five times more likely to experience assaults/ threats, as compared to the manufacturing sector. Being part of a chain business doubled the risk (similar to property crime), and businesses employing over ten staff members had nearly twice the risk. Although one might not expect to see burglar alarms impacting on assault/ threats, it is surprising to see that the presence of manned security has no impact on the risk of assaults/threats and (as with property crime) businesses with CCTV have increased risks of assault/ threats. Some previous research has identified that working in food/accommodation, retail or transport sectors promote risk, as there is close customer contact and cash handling is often required (see for example Chappell & Di Martino, 2006) . Indeed the British Retail Consortium (BRC) (2015:32) notes that violence is most likely to occur 'when staff challenge customers suspected of theft, when asking for proof of age, in relation to a store ban, or if customers are being detained on suspicion of an offence'. The data also reveal high risk of assault/threats for the arts/recreation sector. Further analysis highlighted that 31% of all victims (n=151) in this sector were in sports clubs, 19% were gyms and 13% were in gambling business. Some previous research has noted a high risk of violence in licenced gambling premises (Griffiths & Hopkins, 2001) , though little known research to date has focused on the risks for staff in gyms and sporting environments.
The key risk factors for robbery are being in the retail sector, employing over ten staff members and selling alcohol (44%: n=87) of all robbery victims were retailers that sell alcohol). This confirms previous research suggesting that offenders will select targets where there will be guaranteed cash or goods (such as alcohol/ cigarettes) that are easy to consume/resell (Gill & Pease, 1998) . However, the regression output also illustrates that it is the businesses that employ over ten staff members and those that are part of chain that carry higher risks (rather than smaller independent businesses). Again, the presence of manned guarding or CCTV seems to make little difference to the risk of victimisation. This finding is counterintuitive to what one might expect to observe. However, evaluations of the efficacy of CCTV in business settings report mixed findings (see Taylor & Gill, 2014 : Lasky et al, 2015 and little work has identified whether manned guarding actually reduce the risk of violence or robbery in commercial settings. However, some evidence suggests that, especially in licenced premises, security guards can act as generators of violence (Hobbs et al., 2002) .
The data also highlight two further issues worthy of discussion. First, while it has been recognised that larger businesses tend to be at higher risk of crime, little research has identified that businesses that are part of a 'chain' (rather than independent locations) carry higher risks of victimisation. Across each model, being part of a 'chain' increased risk (especially in relation to violence). Further analysis revealed that the increased pattern of risk for chain businesses was common across all business sectors. For example, in 2013, 34%
and 30% of chain businesses in the accommodation and arts sectors (respectively) were victims of at least one violent crime, compared to 12% and 10% of businesses in these sectors that were not part of a chain. A factor that might partially explain this is that the chain businesses have higher footfalls than independent businesses. For example, in 2013, 43% of all chain businesses claimed to have a footfall of over 1000 customers per week, compared to only 8% of independent businesses. It is plausible to suggest this higher footfall might also bring a higher flow of motivated offenders into these businesses.
Second, as Table 8 illustrates, there is a relationship between the IMD index of businesses and the risk of both interpersonal and property crime. For interpersonal crime, the highest rates per 1,000 employees are generally observed in the most deprived areas. For example, across the two CVS sample groups, there were 114 violent incidents per 1,000 employees in IMD 1 as compared to 12 per 1,000 in IMD 10. In relation to property crimes, those businesses located in the top five most deprived areas all had higher rates of property crime compared to those in the five least deprived areas. Indeed, previous research has highlighted that residents located in the poorest areas of cities have higher risks of victimisation than those in more affluent areas (Bottoms, 2012) . This pattern appears to be replicated for commercial victims of crime. 
Some Reflections: Businesses as ideal victims?
Some scholars have argued that businesses have managed to gain sympathy in policy circles by perpetrating the notion of the 'victimised business' and emphasising the economic burden of the crimes they face (Whyte, 2007) . However, simply identifying that businesses suffer from high rates of victimisation does not automatically allow one to conclude they should be considered as 'ideal' or 'deserving' victims. In the following section, Christie's (1986) ideal victim framework is used as a heuristic device to explore whether a business could ever be considered as an 'ideal' or 'deserving' victim. The analysis is based upon the findings from the CVS presented above, though it draws upon other sources where relevant.
1. The business is 'weak': Christie (1986) notes that a requirement of 'ideal victim' status is 'weakness'. In relation to people, this is often considered in the terms of physical characteristics of the victim and thus, the elderly, children or females may often be considered physically weak and 'ideal' victims. It is postulated here that, if a business is to be considered weak then a combination of three factors are important -vulnerability to crime, the impact of crime and the extent the businesses can protect themselves from further crime. The analysis in this paper does illustrate that businesses experience high rates of crime and this is unevenly distributed -with larger and economically prosperous businesses suffering higher rates of crime.
Therefore, the strongest appear to bear the brunt of victimisation. However, the analysis also illustrates that the financial impact of crime may actually fall more heavily on those businesses with a lower turnover and those least able to invest in crime prevention. Therefore, a subset of businesses emerges that includes businesses that are particularly 'weak' or vulnerable to crime. These, of course, may not constitute ideal victims in the sense that Christie envisaged, but in the context of commercial victimisation, they represent the types of businesses that may elicit the greatest sympathy. Of course, it also needs to be remembered that a significant proportion of crimes against businesses are interpersonal crimes against frontline staff. While these victims are not necessarily physically weak, the analysis suggests they are placed in a vulnerable or weak position as a part of their normal working routines where security (such as CCTV and manned guarding) seem to have little influence on protecting them. The analysis also reveals higher risks to staff working in businesses located in the bottom 20% of IMDs. It is plausible to suggest that these staff members may also live close by to the businesses where they work. Therefore they may not only live in locations where the risk of crime victimisation is already high (Bottoms, 2012) , but are then also placed in a further position of vulnerability in the workplace.
2. The business is carrying out a respectable 'project': in order to be considered as carrying out a 'respectable' project, the victim needs to be pursuing legally and morally acceptable activities. All of the businesses in the CVS sample were VAT registered, so they were all (in a legal sense) engaging in a respectable project. While 3. The business is not to be blamed: the ethics of victimhood only generate empathy where the victim is obviously blameless (Van Wijk, 2013) . In the context of business crime, a number of questions arise in relation to the concept of victim blaming or victim-precipitation (see Walklate, 2007 ) that require further exploration. For example, there is a question of whether empathy for businesses be expressed in cases where the following occur:
• Marketing activities designed to attract legitimate customers generate crime.
For example, Curtis (1971) notes that retailers encourage crime by placing tempting consumable items freely in view and making them easily accessible to customers.
• Businesses are perceived to overprice goods. Often businesses are accused of generating crime through overpricing of goods. For example, as a consequence of the overpricing of fuel, it has been reported that many drivers have felt morally justified to engage in fuel theft (see Euro2day, 2014 ).
• Organizational practices generate crime. As Beck (2011) illustrates, selfcheck-out payment systems designed to allow customers to scan and pay for their items can generate increased shrinkage as customers often choose not to scan items. It has also been suggested that some large retailers are aware that such practices can increase crime, but are willing to accept crime if costs are offset by savings on labour (see Beck & Hopkins, 2015) .
• 4. The offender is big and bad: ideal victim status is dependent upon the offender being physically stronger than the victim and the victim being morally superior (i.e.
engaged in a respectable project). A concerted attempt has been made in recent years not only to suggest that commercial offenders are big and bad, but also that they are becoming more clever and sophisticated. Indeed, both in the USA and the UK, reference is often made to the extent of organised crime against businesses (see Bamfield, 2012; BRC, 2015) and the sophisticated methods used by offenders. The evidence from the CVS sample group is that a relatively small proportion of crime is thought to be the work of organised criminals (the survey suggests that around 8% of all customer theft is linked to organised crime). Indeed, according to Gill (2000) , many offenders work alone, they tend to be fairly rational in thinking and would rather not use violence when offending. Of course, the narrative that businesses are the target of big organised crime groups or offenders that are extremely violent allows interest groups to accentuate the risks to businesses and reinforce the view that offenders are not morally justified in targeting businesses. While the CVS data do
show that employees are occasionally confronted by weapons in the course of their duties, the small number of injuries suggests that if offenders are 'bad', they rarely inflict serious injuries on victims.
5. The offender is unknown: victim status is easier to achieve if the offender is unknown (Christie, 1986) . As the CVS data illustrate, the majority of crimes against businesses are property crimes and thus the offender is not known to the victim. However,
Christie goes on to say that the offender that creates the most ideal victim is the one who creates the most anxiety. The CVS did not collect data specifically relating to anxiety about crime. However, the average security expenditure of £20,572 per business in 2012 and £16,003 in 2013 indicates that many businesses owners are sufficiently anxious about crime to spend money on security. Indeed, previous research illustrated that fear and anxiety about crime is common in small businesses, and it is a key factor in explaining security consumption (Hopkins & Fox, 2013) .
6. The business is powerful: in order to claim victim status, the victim needs to be weak enough to be regarded as a victim but powerful enough to claim victim status (Christie, 1986 
Concluding Comments
The recent flurry of activity by the UK government in relation to commercial victimisation represents possibly the largest effort seen globally to collect data on the subject. While the CVS data confirms the findings of previous research -that high rates of crime (in comparison to households) can be observed in the wholesale/retail and accommodation/ food sectorsit also establishes the crime risks across some relatively unexplored sectors -such as arts/entertainment and agriculture. Importantly, the analysis identifies that while larger business with a turnover of over £100k are most at risk for crime, the burden of crime appears to be felt most by those with a smaller turnover (<£100K). Compared to noncommercial contexts, it is also observed there can be high risks of interpersonal violence to frontline staff, most notably in the accommodation/food, arts/ entertainment and retail sectors. 26 The National Business Crime Solution (NBCS) was established to provide a collaborative solution to more effectively tackle cross border, serious and organised crime affecting businesses (see National Business Crime Solution, 2015). Members tend to be large multi-site businesses and NBCS hope to have 60 members by the end of 2015 (there were 40 at the time of writing). 27 This is a quote from an interview completed by the author with a small business owner in Leicester, UK for a project on security consumption.
A primary purpose of the paper was to consider the notion of businesses as 'ideal' victims.
By using Christie's (1986) concept of the ideal victim as a heuristic device, the analysis suggests that while businesses might not readily be ascribed victim status in the same sense as Christie's 'little old lady', there is some utility in the concept. It allows for factors that might be ascribed to the 'deserving' commercial victim to be identified and suggests that a broad spectrum exists from the deserving victim to the undeserving. However, the analysis indicates that it has been in the best interests of businesses to amplify the notion of themselves as victims of crime. In keeping with the sentiments expressed by Whyte (2007) , it is illustrated that within policy circles, there has now been an acceptance of the concept of the 'business as a victim' and as a consequence, there has been a growing effort to develop crime prevention efforts to support businesses. Whether policy officials would label businesses as 'ideal' victims is unclear, but there appears to be support for the idea that businesses require policy support and that the reduction of business crime provides wider benefits to the society (presumably in terms of lower prices for customers and in providing jobs within communities). Whether this actually materialises into help for those smaller businesses that appear most exposed to the effects of crime or if it just allows the larger and most powerful business to play a central role in shaping crime prevention agendas is unclear.
A key criticism of current policy activity and previous academic research in this area may be that 'crimes against businesses' is used as a catch all term and it can perpetrate the idea that all crime against any business is worthy of attention. However, through utilising Christie's model, it is suggested that a more nuanced understanding of business crime can be developed and further research attention possibly directed towards analysis of the impact of crime on businesses that appear most economically vulnerable and less able to protect 6. The business 'crime-drop': there is an indication from the CVS that crime against businesses might be decreasing, and this might mirror long-term decreases in noncommercial environments (see Farrell et al., 2011) . Further research might usefully explore whether trends in business crime do mirror those observed more generally.
Finally, the data in this paper are based on surveys of businesses in England/Wales.
Internationally, data on commercial victimisation are patchy; though some research has been conducted across several nations (see Mugellini, 2013) . While some contemporary international comparative research on the extent of commercial victimisation would be useful, reflection about how businesses are perceived as victims across different countries would also be a welcome addition to the paucity of literature in this area.
